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 ?DƵƚŝŶǇƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞ^ƵŶ: The Connaught Rangers, India, 1920 ? 
Abstract 
This article re-examines the causes of the Connaught Rangers mutiny and argues that institutional 
failings in the British Army were far more influential in the breakdown of discipline than the oft-
supposed politicisation of its participants. New and under-used source material demonstrates how 
the popular myth surrounding the actions of James Daly and his co-conspirators was nothing more 
than a self-serving exaggeration of events designed to fit an idealised Nationalist narrative of Irish 
resistance to British rule. More compelling is the argument that demobilisation left the regiment with 
an imbalance in officer-man relations that tipped a combustible situation over the edge.  
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 On 5 July 1920 The Times printed an article entitled  ‘Tampering with the Army. Sinn Féin in 
/ŶĚŝĂ ? ?1 It related the course of events, which saw 300 men of the Connaught Rangers stationed in the 
Punjab ŐƌŽƵŶĚĂƌŵƐŽŶĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨďĞŝŶŐ ‘ŝŶƐǇŵƉĂƚŚǇǁŝƚŚ/ƌĞůĂŶĚ ?ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐŶĞǁƐŽĨƌŝƚŝƐŚƌĞƉƌŝƐĂůƐ
back home. It was a headline that conjured fearful reminders of Feninan infiltration in the 1860s, the 
severity of which, coupled with tŚĞ ĂŶǆŝĞƚǇ ƐƵƌƌŽƵŶĚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƚĞƌŵ  ‘ŵƵƚŝŶǇ ? ŝŶ /ŶĚŝĂ ĂĨƚĞƌ  ? ? ? ? ?
transformed what was a local incident into concerns for the stability of the Empire.2 The fact that 
Indian nationalists interpreted these events as an act of imperial solidarity following the Amritsar 
massacre in 1919, merely added to the apprehension.3 As such, it was dealt with in swift and severe 
fashion, with sixty-one ringleaders being sentenced by courts-martial. The majority were imprisoned, 
but fourteen were condemned to death. Of these, thirteen had their sentences commuted. Only 
James Joseph Daly, of Tyrrellspass, Co. Westmeath, was executed for his part in leading an attack on 
                                                          
1 The Times, 5 July 1920. 
2 K. Jeffery ?  ‘dŚĞ/ƌŝƐŚŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶŝŶ ƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚŵƉŝƌĞ ? ? ŝŶ< ?Jeffery (ed.),  ?Ŷ/ƌŝƐŚŵƉŝƌĞ ? ?ƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨ
Ireland and the British Empire (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1996), p. 117. For more on Fenianism 
see, A. Jackson, Ireland 1798-1998 (Blackwell, Oxford, 1999), pp. 93-109; B. Jenkins, The Fenian Problem: 
Insurgency and Terrorism in a Liberal State 1858-1874 (McGill-YƵĞĞŶ ?ƐhŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇWƌĞƐƐ ?DŽŶƚƌĞĂů ?<ŝŶŐƐƚŽŶ ?
2008); and contributions in F. McGarry & J. McConnel (eds.), The Black Hand of Republicanism: Fenianism in 
Modern Ireland (Irish Academic Press, Dublin, 2009). For more on the Indian Mutiny and the British army, see E. 
M. Spiers, The Army and Society 1815-1914 (Longman Group Ltd, London, 1980), pp, 121-144; and H. Strachan, 
The Politics of the British Army (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997), pp. 90-91. 
3 : ?KŚůŵĞǇĞƌ ? ‘/ƌĞůĂŶĚ ?/ŶĚŝĂĂŶĚƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚŵƉŝƌĞ ? ?^ƚƵĚŝĞƐŝŶWĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ,ŝƐƚŽƌǇ, vol. 2, no. 2, (2015), pp. 179-
180. For more on relations between Irish and Indian nationalists ?ƐĞĞD ?^ŝůǀĞƐƚƌŝ ? “dŚĞ^ŝŶŶFéin ŽĨ/ŶĚŝĂ ? P/ƌŝƐŚ
EĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ WŽůŝĐŝŶŐŽĨ ZĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶĂƌǇ dĞƌƌŽƌŝƐŵ ŝŶ ĞŶŐĂů ? ?Journal of British Studies, vol. 39, no. 4, 





a magazine at the Solon outpost that cost two men their lives and left another seriously wounded. At 
dawn on 2 November 1920, Daly was shot by firing squad. 
 Whereas this act brought the event to a close for the British authorities, it provided a 
ŵĂƌƚǇƌĚŽŵĨŽƌƚŚĞEĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐƚŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞƚŽĞǆƉůŽŝƚŝŶ/ƌĞůĂŶĚ ?ƐƐƚƌƵŐŐůĞĨŽƌŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞ ?&ŽƌŚĞƌĞǁĂƐ
a young man of twenty, who had dared to strike at the heart of the British Empire on behalf of all 
Irishmen. More than that, here was a man who, when faced with a choice that struck at the core of 
his conflicted ŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇĂƐĂŶ ‘/ƌŝƐŚŵĂŶŝŶĂƌŝƚŝƐŚƵŶŝĨŽƌŵ ? ?was brave enough to take a political stance 
inspired by IRA action thousands of miles away  W or so the story continues to be told by some.4 More 
recent academic studies have tended to distance the mutiny from the entanglements of political re-
appropriation that has promoted a collective amnesia concerning complicit Irish involvement in the 
British army. Instead, a more nuanced account has emerged which melds together external as well as 
military factors to explain the breakdown of discipline. Anthony Babington led the way in this regard 
by expunging the myth developed by T.P. Kilfeather and Sam Pollock in the late 1960s, that somehow 
the Connaught Rangers mutiny was inspired by Black and Tan atrocities.5 Others have corrected the 
misapprehension that the mutiny took place in 1916, or that it was a pre-meditated Sinn Féin attack 
led by a politicised James Daly.6 Nevertheless, decades ? worth of popularisation through print, on 
screen, and across the airwaves has created a seemingly impenetrable wall of opposition against 
which historians have had to contend. However, with the release of new source material online, such 
as the Bureau of Military History (BMH) documents and the Military Service Pensions Collection 
(MSPC), as well as material from the National Army Museum (NAM), Imperial War Museum (IWM), 
The National Archives, Kew (TNA), and The National Archives, Ireland (NAI), revisiting the Connaught 
Rangers mutiny ahead of its centenary appears a worthwhile endeavour.7 Through piecing together 
these disparate holdings, it is now possible to qualify the political motivations of those involved and 
reassert the military nature of this breakdown in discipline. 
This is not to say that the political dimension should be entirely disregarded. After all, it did 
form the central theme in the official explanation of events, as well as ƚŚĞŵƵƚŝŶĞĞƌƐ ?ŽǁŶĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƐ 
after their release from British penitentiaries in 1923. Yet this was largely a narrative of convenience. 
                                                          
4 F. Keane in The Independent, 9 January 1999. 
5 A. Babington, The Devil to Pay: The Mutiny of the Connaught Rangers, India, July, 1920 (Leo Cooper, London, 
1991); T.P. Kilfeather, The Connaught Rangers (Anvil Books Ltd, Dublin, 1969), p. 2; and S. Pollock, Mutiny for 
the Cause (Leo Cooper, London, 1969), p. 32. 
6 M. Silvestri, Ireland and India: Nationalism, Empire and Memory (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2009), p. 
 ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚd ?ĂƌƚůĞƚƚ ? ‘dŚĞŽŶŶĂƵŐŚƚZĂŶŐĞƌƐDƵƚŝŶǇ/ŶĚŝĂ ?:ƵůǇ ? ? ? ? ? ?History Ireland, vol. 6, no. 1, (1998), pp. 
5-7. 
7 For some methodological issues concerning the Bureau of Military History witness statements, see F. McGarry, 
 “dŽŽŵĂŶǇŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĞƐ ? ?d,hZhK&D/>/dZz,/^dKZzE^dZ ? ? ? ? ? ?History Ireland, vol. 19, no. 6, 





For the British authorities, Sinn Féin infiltration in a single Irish regiment was easily containable  W 
particularly when it was shown that only two companies participated, while the rest remained loyal. 
More problematic would have been the admission that discipline had broken down due to poor 
officer-man relations resulting from wider structural failings in the post-war army. With the Empire to 
police and British military commitments on the Rhine ongoing, the potential of repeat instances across 
any, and all, units did not bear thinking. For similar reasons, Bolshevist infiltration had been blamed 
for the 1919 demobilisation strikes. However, a recent study has suggested that these were not 
politically motivated, rather just a breakdown of discipline among disgruntled soldiers whose sense of 
patriotic duty changed with the Armistice, and whose seasoned officer and NCO cadre had been 
eroded by demobilisation itself.8  
For the surviving mutineers, on the other hand, politicising the event provided justification for 
a series of developments that had begun rather modestly but had spiralled rapidly out of their control. 
Agitation concerning the state of Irish affairs undoubtedly prompted some men into action, but it was 
by no means universal nor the solitary reason for joining in the riotous behaviour. It did, however, 
provide them with an opportunity to recast themselves as political casualties in the fight for Irish 
independence after the event, as the newly-established Free State sought to compensate the 
deserving for their personal and material losses at the hands of the British. The mutineers sought to 
ďĞŶĞĨŝƚĨƌŽŵǁŚĂƚĂǀŝĚ&ŝƚǌƉĂƚƌŝĐŬŚĂƐĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐ ‘ƚŚĞŽĨƚĞŶƉĂŝŶĨƵůĂŶĚĞŵďĂƌƌĂƐƐŝŶŐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ
ŽĨ ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂů ĐŽŵŵĞŵŽƌĂƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ ^ŽƵƚŚĞƌŶ /ƌĞůĂŶĚ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ  ? ? ? ? ĂŶĚ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ĨŽĐƵƐƐĞĚ ŽŶ
compensation rather than memorialisation.9 This became the driving force (on both sides) behind 
establishing the mutiny as a political stand, despite the evidence suggesting that it was little more 
than a breakdown of regimental discipline resulting from poor officer-man relations. 
 
 The first thing to note about the mutiny is that it was fairly modest in size and scope. 
Wellington Barracks at Jullundur had already been vacated by A Company, which had headed for the 
hill outpost at Jutogh, and all but fifty men of C Company, which had moved to Solon - each 
approximately 200 miles away. This left just half the battalion in situ when the mutiny broke out.  
Initially, only five men (Joseph Hawes, Christopher Sweeney, Patrick Gogarty, William Daly  W :ĂŵĞƐ ?
older brother  W and Stephen Lally) found Lance Corporal John Flannery on the morning of 28 June 
1920 to state their intentions to ground arms. Flannery, a veteran of the regiment since 1908, 
                                                          
8 My thanks go to WilliĂŵƵƚůĞƌǁŚŽŚĂƐĂůůŽǁĞĚŵĞƚŽĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂĚƌĂĨƚŽĨŚŝƐĨŽƌƚŚĐŽŵŝŶŐĂƌƚŝĐůĞ ? “dŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚ
^ŽůĚŝĞƌŝƐŶŽŽůƐŚĞǀŝŬ ? ?dŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚƌŵǇ ?ŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞĞŵŽďŝůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ^ƚƌŝŬĞƐŽĨ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
9  ?&ŝƚǌƉĂƚƌŝĐŬ ?  ‘ŽŵŵĞŵŽƌĂƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ /ƌŝƐŚ&ƌĞĞ^ƚĂƚĞ PĂĐŚƌŽŶŝĐůĞ ŽĨĞŵďĂƌƌĂƐƐŵĞŶƚ ? ? ŝŶ ? / ?DĐƌŝĚĞ  ?ĞĚ ? ? ?





ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚĞĚƚŽĚŝƐƐƵĂĚĞƚŚĞŵĞŶ ?ůĞĂĚŝŶŐƚŽtŝůůŝĂŵĂůǇ ?ƐǁŝƚŚĚƌĂǁĂů ?/ŶůĂƚĞƌǇĞĂƌƐ ?&ůĂŶŶĞƌǇǁŽƵůĚ
suggest that this was the moment where he assumed the leadership of the mutiny.10 However, only 
the four remaining men voluntarily presented themselves at the Guard Room for arrest on account of 
ďĞŝŶŐ ‘ŝŶƐǇŵƉĂƚŚǇǁŝƚŚ/ƌĞůĂŶĚ ? ?From here the mutiny spread as more than 200 men were persuaded 
to follow suit. The officers present heard the grievances put forward by the men through their elected 
spokesman, Flannery, who by this stage had changed sides. It was understood that the situation in 
Ireland would prevent the men from soldiering further, but that no violence was intended.11 The 
authorities were alerted and a relief force sent to reclaim control of the barracks. By the time of their 
arrival on 1 July, 300 or so mutineers, were marched to a prepared camp outside the compound to 
await further action. Thereafter, the ringleaders were separated from the majority who were cajoled 
back to the regiment. 
Two days beforehand, on 29 June, the mutineers had decided to send emissaries to A and C 
companies in Jutogh and Solon respectively, but only succeeded in mobilising the latter into action. 
Thus, it was only on 30 June that James Daly sprang into action, leading between seventy and eighty 
ŵĞŶƚŽƚŚĞKĨĨŝĐĞƌ ?ƐDĞƐƐƚŽĚĞĐůĂƌĞƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐŝŶƐǇŵƉĂƚŚǇǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĚĞĐůĂƌĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨtheir comrades 
in Jullundur. The Commanding Officer (CO) in Solon, Major W.N.S. Alexander, attempted to reason 
with Daly and his men, but received little in the way of response. Anxious to avoid bloodshed, an 
agreement was struck between the officers and the mutineers, via the regimental chaplain, Father 
Baker, that all weapons and ammunition would be placed under guard in the camp magazine. 
However, by nightfall Daly and his comrades had decided to reclaim their weapons. The attack that 
ensued cost the lives of Privates Patrick Smythe and Peter Sears, and seriously wounded Private 
Eugene Egan, before being abandoned. Daly, who had identified himself as the ringleader during the 
attack, was among those who was arrested the next day by a detachment of South Wales Borderers 
who arrived at the camp.12 Between both Jullundur and Solon, sixty-one ringleaders were tried by 
courts-martial. 
 
The established view of the Connaught Rangers mutiny is that it was enacted by green recruits 
who had enlisted in the post-war period and were, as such, unaccustomed to the monotony, rigours 
and discipline of military life. It provided a simple, and ultimately palatable, explanation for what had 
occurred, and was heavily stressed by the regimental historian, H.F.N. Jourdain, a former Colonel of 
                                                          
10 Babington, Devil to Pay, pp. 3-6. 
11 Ibid., p. 10. 





the 5th ĂƚƚĂůŝŽŶ ? ǁŚŽ ǁĂƐ ŬĞĞŶ ƚŽ ŬĞĞƉ ƚŚĞ ƵŶŝƚ ?Ɛ ƉƌŽƵĚ ŚŝƐƚŽƌǇƵŶďůĞŵŝƐŚĞĚ ?13 Babington, too, 
emphasised the fact that out of the 206 men comprising the last two drafts from Britain, 172 were 
mutineers at Jullundur.14 However, this did not necessarily mean that they lacked military experience 
altogether. The Summary of Evidence of the courts-martial held at Solon revealed an entirely different 
dynamic. Of the sixty-one men tried, the majority were war veterans of considerable service, with 
thirty of them having spent more than five years in the armed forces. A detailed breakdown of the 
remainder suggested that four had served for between one and two years, three between two and 
three years, eight between three and four years, six between four and five years, and ten for an 
unknown period of time.15 Some were young and inexperienced, undoubtedly. The muster books for 
the regiment indicated that at least nine of those sentenced by courts-martial had enlisted as late as 
1919, including James Daly. Nevertheless, the regiment as a whole, and the mutineers in particular, 
contained a significant cadre of experienced and well-drilled men, hardened by years of frontline 
service. As such, to claim that the mutiny occurred on account of an influx of raw recruits 
unaccustomed to the strains and drudgery of military life is somewhat problematic. 
Indeed, J.C.W. Francis, of the 19th Hussars, and the last surviving witness to the courts-martial 
ƉƌŽĐĞĞĚŝŶŐƐ ?ĚŝĚŶŽƚĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌ ƚŚĞƵŶŝƚ ?Ɛ ŝŶĞǆperience as a contributing factor to the revolt. Whilst 
ŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚŝŶŐƐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞŵŝƚŝŐĂƚŝŶŐĐŝƌĐƵŵƐƚĂŶĐĞƐƚŚĂƚǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞĂĨĨĞĐƚĞĚĂůůŵĞŶ ? ‘ƚŚĞŚŽƚǁĞĂƚŚĞƌ ?
ĂŶĚ ‘ǁĂŶƚŽĨƐĂƚŝƐĨĂĐƚŽƌǇŽĐĐƵƉĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĂĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ ? ?ƚŚĞĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐǁĂƐĨŝƌŵůǇƉůĂĐĞĚŽŶƚŚĞ ‘ƵŶƌĞƐƚin 
/ƌĞůĂŶĚ ? ? ‘ůĞƚƚĞƌƐĨƌŽŵŚŽŵĞ ? ? ‘ǀĞƌǇƉŽŽƌĚŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĞŝŶĚĞĞĚĂŶĚŽĨƚŚĞĞŶƚŝƌĞůǇƵŶŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶƚƐŽƌƚ ? ?ĂŶĚ
ĨŝŶĂůůǇ ‘ĞǆƚƌĞŵĞůǇďĂĚƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐĂŶĚŵĞŶ ? ?16 This would suggest that other military 
factors were the root cause in the breakdown of discipline and that culpability lay predominantly with 
the individual officers present as opposed to supposed greenness of the men. 
The complicated bond of officer-man relations had undergone a significant transformation 
during the war to accommodate the millions of men joining the colours. The old Victorian principles 
of sustaining discipline and morale through the carrot and the stick, supplemented by a miasmic 
concept of regimental esprit de corps, were a thing of the past.17 ƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐŶĞǁĐŝƚŝǌĞŶĂƌŵǇ ?Ăs David 
                                                          
13 H.F.N. Jourdain and E. Fraser, The Connaught Rangers, (3 vols., London, 1926) I, pp. 570-571. 
14 Babington, Devil, p. 41. 
15 NAI, 2000/6/11, Summary of Evidence: Solon, 18 August 1920. This counters suggestions made in the Dáil 
Éireann Debates of December 1930, which suggested a majority of Connaught Rangers mutineers had fewer 
ƚŚĂŶƚŚƌĞĞǇĞĂƌƐŽĨƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ ?&ŽƌŵŽƌĞŽŶƚŚŝƐ ?ƐĞĞD ?ŽůĞŵĂŶ ? ‘&ŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůƌĞŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶĂƐƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞĨŽƌǀĞƚĞƌĂŶƐŽĨ
the Irish revolution (1916-23): post-ĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚƉŽůŝĐǇŝŶĂŶŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůƐĞƚƚŝŶŐ ? ? ?KƉĞŶĂĐĐĞƐƐǁŽƌking paper, Institute 
for the Study of Conflict Transformation and Social Justice, June 2015), p. 19. 
16 NAM, 7609-35-12, J.C.W. Francis to F.W.S. Jourdain, 21 November 1970. 
17 G. Sheffield, Leadership in the Trenches: Officer-Man Relations, Morale and Discipline in the British Army in 





ŶŐůĂŶĚĞƌŶŽƚĞĚ ?ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐƚŽůĞĂƌŶƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞŝƌĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ ?ƚŚŽƵŐŚŝŶƚŚĞŽƌǇŶŽŶ-negotiable, was 
in practice conditional upon the development of appropriate man-management skills. Inefficiency and 
incompetence were not easily concealed from men who rapidly became keen judges of officer 
ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ ? ?18 sĞƚĞƌĂŶƐŽĨ ƚŚĞŽŶŶĂƵŐŚƚZĂŶŐĞƌƐ ?ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶƐ ŝŶDĞƐŽƉŽƚĂŵŝĂ ?'ĂůůŝƉŽůŝĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ
Western Front, along with those who had served in other units, remained as acutely critical, and highly 
expectant, oĨ ƚŚĞŝƌ ŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐ ĂĨƚĞƌ  ? ? ? ? ĂƐ ƚŚĞǇ ĚŝĚ ĚƵƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ǁĂƌ ĚĞƐƉŝƚĞ ƚŚĞ ƌĞƚƵƌŶ ƚŽ  ‘ƉƌŽƉĞƌ
ƐŽůĚŝĞƌŝŶŐ ? ?dŚŝƐĐƌĞĂƚĞĚĂƉƌŽďůĞŵĨŽƌƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŵĞŶƚ ?ǁŚŽƐĞŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐƐĞĞŵĞĚŝŶĐĂƉĂďůĞŽĨ ?ŽƌƵŶǁŝůůŝŶŐ
to, maintain the required standards of paternal command demanded of them by the rank and file.   
Many of the officers who remained with the regiment after demobilisation had held regular 
commissions in the 1st and 2nd Battalions since before the outbreak of hostilities. As such, they were 
more accustomed to the pre-war concept of discipline than many of their New Army counterparts 
who had obtained commissions in the Service Battalions during wartime. It created a division of 
experience between the two that was particularly pronounced in the case of the Connaught Rangers 
and goes some way to explaining the breakdown of officer-man relations that led to the mutiny. The 
Regular battalions, except for a brief period in France in 1914, spent the majority of the war in the less 
intense theatre of Mesopotamia, which meant that they could not draw on the unifying experience of 
combat to the same extent as other units. Conversely, the 5th and 6th Service Battalions accrued a 
wealth of experience from their time in Gallipoli and the Somme that fostered a different sense of 
understanding between officers and men. Discipline remained strict, particularly in the 6th Service 
Battalion, whose commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel. Rowland Feilding, a Guardsman before his 
transfer, referred a particularly high number of cases to courts-martial whilst in command.19 Yet, a 
combination of trust in his leadership and appreciation for a fair, albeit harsh, justice system, earned 
him the respect of his men all the same.20 It was a demonstration of how an officer could succeed in 
implementing regular standards on a New Army unit without crippling morale. However, this was not 
necessarily the approach taken by the officers who remained with the regiment after the war, the 
majority of whom had served with the Regular battalions. Their appreciation of discipline remained 
firmly wedded to pre-1914 concepts on account of their different wartime experience. This proved 
particularly dislocating for the regiment, whose ranks included men who had served in the Service 
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Battalions and across a number of other units in the British Army that had been far more receptive to 
the concept of changing officer-man relations of a citizen army. 
Some institutional failings upon demobilisation did little to help the matter either. The move 
from a wartime to a peacetime footing produced fierce competition for regular commissions among 
an expanded officer corps. Although vast numbers left the army almost immediately, the number of 
ƌĞŐƵůĂƌŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐǁŚŽƌĞŵĂŝŶĞĚŝŶƚŚĞĂƌŵǇƌĞƐƵůƚĞĚŝŶĂŶ ‘ĞŵďĂƌƌĂƐƐŝŶŐƐƵƌƉůƵƐ ? ?21 During its refitting 
at the Shaft Barracks in Dover in 1919, the 1st Battalion found itself in a peculiar situation whereby the 
senior to junior officer ratio was completely out of kilter. F.W.S. Jourdain, the then adjutant, recalled 
the particularly top-heavy imbalance, which saw three or four majors remain with the battalion for 
want of anywhere suitable to put them. Ordinarily, one or two would have sufficed. This was 
compounded by the fact that there were only one or two captains, and that Colonel H.R.G. Deacon 
ǁĂƐŶŽƚĚƵĞƚŽũŽŝŶƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŵĞŶƚƵŶƚŝůŝƚĂƌƌŝǀĞĚŝŶ/ŶĚŝĂ ?ůĞĂǀŝŶŐǁŚĂƚǁĞƌĞĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐ ‘ŶŽƚĂǀĞƌǇ
ďƌŝŐŚƚůŽƚ ?ŝŶĐŚĂƌŐĞǁŝƚŚŽƵƚĂĚĞƋƵĂƚĞƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ?22 The June 1920 Army List confirms that, by the time 
of the mutiny, the Connaught Rangers possessed five majors and just three captains, whereas the 
average battalion stationed overseas could count on between three and four majors and five, but 
usually six, captains.23 /Ŷ :ŽƵƌĚĂŝŶ ?Ɛ ŽƉŝŶŝŽŶ ? ƚŚŝƐ ǁĂƐ ƚŚĞ ŵĂŝŶ ƌĞĂƐŽŶ ďĞŚŝŶĚ ƚŚĞ ďƌĞĂŬĚŽǁŶ ŽĨ
discipline in the regiment. Without a uniform command structure it became very easy for the majors 
to detach themselves from the men and subalterns under their command, meaning that they had little 
understanding of the problems concerning the men about Ireland or the prospect of shipping out to 
India.24 More to the point, they were equally incapable of satisfactorily controlling the situation once 
faced with open rebellion.  
dŚŝƐǁĂƐĂĐŽŶĐĞƌŶŝŶŐƐƚĂƚĞŽĨĂĨĨĂŝƌƐ ?ŶŽƚůĞĂƐƚďĞĐĂƵƐĞ ?ĂƐĂǀŝĚ&ƌĞŶĐŚŚĂƐŶŽƚĞĚ ?K ?ƐŽĨƚĞŶ
held the key to maintaining discipline in their unit. The tactless handling of a battalion of Grenadier 
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Guards at Pirbright Camp in June 1919 demonstrated that even the most reliable of soldiers could 
mutiny as a result of poor officer-man relations.25 The mutiny of the 39th Royal Fusiliers (part of the 
Jewish Legion) in Egypt in July 1919 was, equally, triggered by aŶŽĨĨŝĐĞƌ ?Ɛ summary punishment of a 
young soldier for what was a relatively minor offence. The fact that this reflected the blatant anti-
Semitism among the British subalterns and within GHQ Egypt more widely, only added credence to 
the idea that minority groups were even more susceptible to this problem.26 Timothy Bowman has 
ŵĂĚĞĂƐŝŵŝůĂƌƉŽŝŶƚĂďŽƵƚ/ƌŝƐŚƐŽůĚŝĞƌƐ ?KĨƚĞŶƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚĂƐ ‘ĐŚŝůĚ-ůŝŬĞ ?ĂŶĚŵŽƌĞ ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůůǇŵŽƚŝǀĂƚĞĚ
ƚŚĂŶ ƚŚĞŝƌ ŶŐůŝƐŚ ? ^ĐŽƚƚŝƐŚ Žƌ tĞůƐŚ ĐŽƵŶƚĞƌƉĂƌƚƐ ? ?discipline could often be more strictly 
administered.27 When this is coupled with the general increase in court-martial ratios across the army 
in the period 1920-1921, two things become evident. The first is that the military authorities struggled 
to reassert discipline in the post-war army as a whole.28 The second is that Irish regiments were even 
more likely, given the highly-charged political climate, to be offered little in the way of leniency by 
often detached and unsympathetic British officers were there to be a breakdown of discipline.  
This was the case in the Connaught Rangers, whose officers, junior ones included, has still not 
formed the expected paternalistic bonds with their men by the time they had reached India. Brigadier 
C.I. Jerrard, stationed with the 51st Sikh Regiment at Jullundur in 1920, noted the poor impression 
ŐŝǀĞŶŽĨĨďǇƚŚĞŽŶŶĂƵŐŚƚZĂŶŐĞƌƐ ?ŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐǁŚĞŶŚĞǁƌŽƚĞ P ‘tĞƉůĂǇĞĚĂůŽƚŽĨĨŽŽƚďĂůůĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞ
Rangers but their officers were never present and their teams were run by NCOs. We gained the 
impression that the officers were not in close touch ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞŝƌŵĞŶ ? ?29 In a post-war army, where 
officers and men shared the field more regularly than they had done before 1914 to encourage 
regimental esprit de corps, morale, and discipline, this may be deemed noteworthy.30 It infers that 
officers were expected to take part in such activities on a regular basis (doing so in other units) and 
that their absence in the Connaught Rangers ? case was conspicuous enough to merit attention. 
Despite Lieutenant Hoseason being caught up in a game of football with his platoon at the 
time that the mutiny broke out, and Corporal Kelly and Private Oliver speaking well of Lieutenants 
Sarsfield and Walsh, there was still a sense that all was not well.31 The fact that junior officers did not 
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see eye-to-eye with their superiors either, was perhaps the clearest demonstration of how 
desperately unhealthy the atmosphere in the battalion was. Indeed, Jerrard commented that the 
ƐƵďĂůƚĞƌŶƐ ‘ĂƉƉĞĂƌĞĚƚŽŚĂǀĞ “ĂĐŚŝƉŽŶƚŚĞŝƌƐŚŽƵůĚĞƌ ?ĂŶĚŵƵĐŚƚŽƐĂǇĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞir Colonel and 
ĚũƵƚĂŶƚ ?ǁŚŝĐŚǁĂƐŶŽƚŐŽŽĚĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇƚŽĂŶŽƵƚƐŝĚĞƌůŝŬĞŵǇƐĞůĨ ? ?32 It paints a picture of unnerving 
dislocation that could only have significantly contributed to what was already a volatile situation. In a 
hierarchical institution such as the British Army, whose regimental pride and esprit de corps was 
supposed to run through the entire unit from top to bottom, disharmony and imbalance such as that 
witnessed in the 1st Battalion Connaught Rangers in 1919 and 1920 must certainly be apportioned a 
significant amount of blame for the ensuing breakdown in discipline. It naturally reflected poorly on 
the regiment but, more significantly, on the failures of the army as whole. If it could happen in one 
regiment, it could conceivably happen in another, and it is for this reason that both the regimental 
history and the military authorities preferred to explain the mutiny away through politics. 
An undercurrent of antagonism towards the officers was exposed during the mutiny itself. In 
the case of the regimental Adjutant, Lieutenant, L.W.L. Leader the resentment was long-standing and 
widely felt. Men of all ranks, and even many of the subalterns, particularly disliked him foƌďĞŝŶŐ ‘ƐůǇ
ĂŶĚƵŶƚƌƵƐƚǁŽƌƚŚǇ ? ?,ĞǁĂƐ  ‘ŶĞŝƚŚĞƌůŽǀĞĚ[n]ŽƌƌĞƐƉĞĐƚĞĚďǇĂŶǇŽŶĞ ?.33 The Summary of Evidence at 
Jullundur suggests that there was even open hostility towards him as tension rose during the mutiny. 
When the group of 200 or so disaffected men went to confront Colonel Deacon at his Bungalow on 
28th June, one of their number ?WƌŝǀĂƚĞ^ĐĂŶůŽŶ ?ƚŚƌĞĂƚĞŶĞĚ>ĞĂĚĞƌďǇƐƚĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŚĞǁŽƵůĚ ‘ŬŶŽĐŬ
 ?ŚŝƐ ?ďůŽĐŬŽĨĨ ?ĨŽƌŚĂǀŝŶŐďĞĞŶŐŝǀĞŶƐĞǀĞƌĂůŵŽŶƚŚƐ ? ŝŵƉƌŝƐŽŶŵĞŶƚďǇŚŝŵ ?34 Deacon himself, was 
also said to have been Ă ‘ŐƌĞĂƚďƵůůǇ ?ǁŚŽ ‘ƚŝĐŬĞĚŽĨĨƐĞŶŝŽƌŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐŝŶĨƌŽŶƚ ĨƚŚĞũƵŶiors, and what 
ǁĂƐǁŽƌƐĞ ?ŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐŝŶĨƌŽŶƚŽĨƚŚĞŵĞŶ ? ?35 There was similar enmity towards certain officers at Solon. 
Captain Leslie Badham, for example, showed a complete disregard for common sense on the day of 
the mutiny when he told the group of seventǇŵĞŶǁŚŽŚĂĚĐŽŶŐƌĞŐĂƚĞĚŽƵƚƐŝĚĞƚŚĞŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐ ?ŵĞƐƐ
to voice their concerns, that their scheduled holiday for the next day was to be postponed until the 
following Saturday in order to complete a musketry course.36 This was to be two days later than 
anticipated. Given the heat of the Indian summer, the prospect of further drill when it was expected 
to have leave did not sit well amongst the already agitated men. Records detailing the day-to-day 
activities of the detachment in the weeks leading up to the mutiny are, unfortunately, not available, 
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but it would appear as if there was a general feeling of being over-worked for want of ideas amongst 
the officers of how else to keep the men active in the isolated station in the Simla Hills.  
Whereas the aforementioned instances were a result of the post-war hangover of command, 
where pre-1914 concepts of discipline continued to be implemented, other officers were simply 
unsuited to their commands through vice or over-promotion. Major Payne was a case in point, rarely 
ďĞŝŶŐƐĞĞŶƐŽďĞƌƉĂƐƚƚŚĞŚŽƵƌŽĨƐŝǆŽ ?ĐůŽĐŬ ?37 It was later claimed by one of the mutineers, Joseph 
Hawes, that Payne was under the influence on the night of the mutiny, which was not altogether 
improbable given his past history. However, the assertion that he gave orders to have the mutineers 
ƐŚŽƚ ĚŽǁŶ ůŝŬĞ ĚŽŐƐ ǁĂƐ ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐ ĂŶ ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŽǀĞƌ ĞǆĂŐŐĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ĐŽŵŵŽŶ ƚŽ ,ĂǁĞƐ ?  ? ? ? ?
statement in which he, himself, declared that allowances ought to be made for lapses in memory and 
biased opinions.38 Meanwhile, others such as Majors Nolan-Ferral, Lloyd, and Truell were described 
ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇĂƐŚĂǀŝŶŐ  ‘ŶŽ ŝŵĂŐŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?  ‘ŶŽƚĂƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇĚŝƐƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚĞĚŽĨĨŝĐĞƌ ? ?ĂŶĚ  ‘ŽŶĞŽĨ ƚŚĞƐĞ
ŵĂũŽƌƐǁŚŽŶĞǀĞƌƐĞĞŵƚŽŐĞƚďĞǇŽŶĚƚŚĂƚ ? P ƚŚŽƵŐŚ ŝƚŵƵƐƚďĞŶŽƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ůĂƚƚĞr was CO of A 
Company stationed in Jutogh who remained loyal.39 Of the more senior officers, Colonel Deacon and 
Major Alexander were accused of severe incompetence, with the former being relieved of his 
command on the 29th for his gross mishandling of the situation at Jullundur and the latter castigated 
ĨŽƌůŽƐŝŶŐĐŽŶƚƌŽůĂƚ^ŽůŽŶ ?/ŶĚĞĞĚ ?ůĞǆĂŶĚĞƌ ?ƐĚŝƚŚĞƌŝŶŐĂŶĚƌĞĨƵƐĂůƚŽůŝƐƚĞŶƚŽĂĚǀŝĐĞĨƌŽŵũƵŶŝŽƌ
officers was viewed particularly poorly.40 The subalterns were subsequently blamed by a Court of 
Enquiry, but this was largely to deflect attention away from the failings of the COs who were clearly 
not suited to their positions. A combination of outright incompetence and an unwavering adherence 
to out-dated methods of command were certainly among the most influential factors in sparking the 
mutiny. Beyond that, blame must similarly be laid at the hands of the army for not rectifying glaring 
inadequacies in its organisation. Notwithstanding, the general air of unrest over events in Ireland 
could also have been managed more carefully by the Indian Government through the censorship of 
mail. 
 
On 9th July 1920, the Army Department of the Indian Government sent a telegram to the War 
KĨĨŝĐĞŝŶ>ŽŶĚŽŶƚŚĂƚƐƚĂƚĞĚ ? ‘tĞŚĂǀĞĞǀĞƌǇƌĞĂƐŽn to believe that the whole affair was engineered 
by Sinn Féin. Large Sinn Féin flags were hoisted in barracks when the mutiny first broke out at 
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Jullundur. These flags were apparently not made in India. Sinn Féin colours and rosettes were also 
ǁŽƌŶ ? ?41 Another telegram sent by the Indian Government to the Secretary of State for India on 21st 
July concurred based on the conclusions of the JullunduƌŽƵƌƚŽĨŶƋƵŝƌǇ ?/ƚƌĞĂĚ ? ‘dŚĞŽƵƚďƌĞĂŬǁĂƐ
a pre-arranged and organized movement. Cause was undoubtedly Sinn Féinism ? ?42 It formed the first 
pre-conceptions that the regiment had been infiltrated by political radicals intent on disrupting the 
establishment from within. In the ensuing months, the courts-martial proceedings at Solon and 
Dagshai further solidified this stance when the mutineers themselves began to suggest that their 
protest was politically inspired. A number of witnesses recalled the signing of rebel songs, the self-
reference as Sinn Féiners, the wearing of rosettes, as well as the flying of a tricolour.43 Yet despite this 
seemingly unanimous view that subversive Sinn Féin elements had made their way into the regiment 
prior to embarkation for India, there are a number of inconsistencies that remained unresolved. 
Firstly, there were conflicting accounts regarding the obtaining of the Sinn Féin rosettes and 
flag, which became central to the narrative of a pre-meditated political strike. In a 1963 radio 
broadcast scripted by Sam Pollock, an attempt was made by Joseph Hawes to suggest that the 
appearance of the flag and rosettes were unaccounted for.44 However, his own witness statement to 
the Bureau of Military History fourteen years earlier is quite clear about the fact that material was 
bought from the bazaar to make the tricolour.45 dŚŝƐ ǁĂƐ ĐŽŶĨŝƌŵĞĚ ďǇ ŽƌƉŽƌĂů W ?: ? <ĞůůǇ ?Ɛ
ƌĞĐŽůůĞĐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨĨŝŶĚŝŶŐĂŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨŵĞŶƐŝƚƚŝŶŐŝŶEŽ ? ? ?ƵŶŐĂůŽǁǁŝƚŚ ‘ƌĞďĞůďĂĚŐĞƐ ?ǁŚĞƌĞŚĞǁĂƐ
told by Private Devers that he ought to wear one of the hundred rosettes that had been ordered from 
the bazaar.46 Lieutenant Leader, too, remembered seeing Hawes wearing a Sinn Féin badge in 
Jullundur, whilst Captain Badham asserted that a flag was hoisted atop a bungalow in Solon.47 Yet, 
despite the incontrovertible evidence regarding the presence of such items during the mutiny  W 
irrespective of their origin  W Lieutenant MacWeeney wrote to F.W.S. Jourdain in 1971 declaring the 
ĞǆĂĐƚŽƉƉŽƐŝƚĞ ? ‘>ĞƚŵĞĞǆƉůŽĚĞĂĨĞǁŵǇƚŚƐ ? ?ŚĞǁƌŽƚĞ ? ‘dŚĞƌĞǁĂƐŶŽƚƌŝĐŽůŽƵƌĨůŽǁŶŽƌĚŝƐƉůĂǇĞĚĂƚ
Solon. Where could it have cŽŵĞ ĨƌŽŵ  ? ƚŚĞǇ ǁĞƌĞ ƌĂƌĞ ĞŶŽƵŐŚ ŝŶ /ƌĞůĂŶĚ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ ƚŝŵĞ ? ?48 His 
postulation has some merit, and whether his recollection was precise or not given the numerous 
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accounts that suggest there was a flag present, it casts further doubts over an organised Sinn Féin cell 
ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŶŐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŽŶŶĂƵŐŚƚ ZĂŶŐĞƌƐ ? /ŶĚĞĞĚ ? ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ ,ĂǁĞƐ ? ƌĞǀŝƐĞĚ ƐƚĂƚĞŵĞŶƚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƌĂĚŝŽ
broadcast, there would be no evidence at all that the flag had been brought from Ireland and the 
matter would never have been opened. 
Quite apart from anything else, the presumption that a pre-meditated political attack on 
British rule in India would be confined to one regiment, and even just three companies of that 
regiment, lacks conviction. Certainly, fears of Sinn Féinism spreading to, or already being present in, 
other Irish units were of immediate concern. It was suggested in the republican Irish Press of 
Philadelphia, for instance, that the events would encourage other Irish regiments to follow suit.49 
,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ĂƉĂƌƚĨƌŽŵŽŶĞƚĞůĞŐƌĂŵƌĞĐĞŝǀĞĚĨƌŽŵ>ŽƌĚ ?bernon, the British Ambassador to Berlin, 
who had concerns about the 1st Battalion Royal Irish ReŐŝŵĞŶƚ ƚŚĂƚǁĂƐ  ‘ĨƵůůŽĨ ^ŝŶŶFéin ? ? ƚŚĞ  ?st
Battalion Royal Dublin Fusiliers and the Irish Guards, no other unit appeared particularly threatening 
in the immediate aftermath.50 Indeed, reports of the 8th  ?<ŝŶŐ ?ƐZŽǇĂů/ƌŝƐŚ ?,ƵƐƐĂƌƐŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇ
were composed of about half Catholic and half Church of England men, and that most of the former 
had enlisted to escape Sinn Féin. The 5th (Royal Irish) Lancers were shown to be only approximately 
thirty per cent Irish, mostly from the North and therefore presumed to be reliable, the Iniskilling 
Fusiliers were eighty ƉĞƌĐĞŶƚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞEŽƌƚŚ ?ǁŚŝůƐƚ ‘ƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐŶŽƚĂŵŽƌĞĐŽŶƚĞŶƚĞĚƵŶŝƚŝŶ/ŶĚŝĂ ?
than the 2nd Royal Irish Regiment.51 Indeed, an examination of the Connaught Rangers ? disbandment 
would also suggest that the authorities were not particularly concerned about the reliability of the 
remainder of its ranks as twenty-six were given military pensions, 131 ended up at the Royal Military 
Hospital Chelsea, and 103 were transferred to other regiments in the British armed forces.52  
There is actually scant suggestion that the mutineers were politically radicalised at the time 
of the mutiny. This came predominantly from the official reports and latterly from the mutineers 
themselves many years after the event. In the summer of 1920 the political motive was relatively 
modest, being simply a spontaneous response to  ‘ƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞŝŶ/ƌĞůĂŶĚ ?.53 While this was enough of a 
ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŐĞƐƚƵƌĞƚŽǁĂƌƌĂŶƚĂƌĞĂĐƚŝŽŶĨƌŽŵƚŚĞďĂƚƚĂůŝŽŶ ?ƐƌŝƚŝƐŚŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐ to constitute mutiny, it lacks 
the conviction of a long-standing enmity towards British rule. Naturally, news received from home 
detailing some of the horrors committed in their absence by the British Auxiliaries was a significant 
contributing factor in their decision to down arms. However, it must not be forgotten that in the 
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searing heat of India, where boredom dominated military life, the men of the Connaught Rangers 
would have been particularly susceptible to any such stories, which, according to The Sunday Express, 
may have been somewhat exaggerated by relatives in Ireland at the time.54 Crucially, though, their 
reaction to what they had read was not pre-planned.  
This was precisely the conclusion arrived at by the Committee set up by the Minister of Finance 
in the Irish Free State to look into the compensation claims of the mutineers in 1925. It reported, 
The Committee are satisfied from the evidence at their disposal that the Mutiny had its 
origin in a desire on the part of the men concerned to protest against the condition of affairs 
existing in Ireland at the time and that the protest which was made was entirely spontaneous. 
 ? Q ?dŚĞŽŶŶĂƵŐŚƚZĂŶŐĞƌƐŽŶƚŚĞŽther hand were not serving in Ireland and were not acting 
under directions from, nor because of any appeal from, nor association with those who were 
conducting affairs in Ireland.55 
Equally, Ernest Blythe was quoted as saying in the Dáil Éireann that some Committee members had 
ĨŽƵŶĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ŝŶƚŚĞĐĂƐĞŽĨƚŚĞŝƌŵƵƚŝŶǇ ?ƉĂƚƌŝŽƚŝƐŵǁĂƐĂŶĂĨƚĞƌƚŚŽƵŐŚƚ ? ?56 Although it was likely that 
ƚŚĞƐĞĐŽŵŵĞŶƚƐĂŶĚƚŚĞŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ?ƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶǁĞƌĞůĂƌŐĞůǇďĂƐĞĚŽŶĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚƚŚĞ
unwillingness to set a precedent for pension claimants, it still demonstrates the level of scepticism 
ƐƵƌƌŽƵŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞŵƵƚŝŶĞĞƌƐ ?ŵŽƚŝǀĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? The fact that their own government, 
who had fought hard to secure their release from British detention, was not prepared to support their 
assertions and use them for political purposes is telling. 
There were of course claims that some mutineers had experienced violence at the hands of 
the British Army whilst on leave prior to embarkation, or at least heard of it through friends and 
relatives. Whilst scouring Ireland for oral testimonies for their upcoming radio programme, Pollock 
and his producer, Maurice Brown, encountered a number of men with such recollections.57 For 
instance, Joseph Hawes was in a crowd that was turned away at bayonet point from a hurling match 
in October 1919. Along with questioning his own loyalties, on account of having a brother in the IRA, 
ŚĞůĂƚĞƌƌĞǀĞĂůĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐǁĂƐƚŚĞƚƵƌŶŝŶŐƉŽŝŶƚƚŚĂƚůĞĚŚŝŵƚŽǁĂŶƚƚŽ ‘ƌĞĚĞĞŵ ?ŚŝŵƐĞůĨ ?58 According 
to Pollock, Daly, too, was aware of the Republican Movement prior to his enlistment as he was 
supposedly a politically conscious individual and an  ‘ĂĐƚŝǀĞ ƐǇŵƉĂƚŚŝƐĞƌ ǁŝƚŚ ^ŝŶŶFéin ? ?59 Indeed, 
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Hawes spoke of a note Daly had written prior to his death in wŚŝĐŚ ƚŚĞ ůĂƚƚĞƌ ŚĂĚ ǁƌŝƚƚĞŶ  ‘hƉ
ĂůďƌŝŐŐĂŶ ?hƉĂůďƌŝŐŐĂŶ ? ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞŝƚŚĂĚďĞĞŶďƵƌŶĞĚďǇƚŚĞůĂĐŬĂŶĚdĂŶƐ ?dŚŝƐŚĂĚŽĐĐƵƌƌĞĚŽŶ
20th September 1920, meaning that firstly, he might only just have received word of it before his 
execution on 2nd November 1920, but more importantly, that it cannot have been among his 
ŵŽƚŝǀĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŽŵƵƚŝŶǇ ŝŶ:ƵůǇ ?,ŝƐƐŝƐƚĞƌ ?ƐƌĞĐŽůůĞĐƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐǁĂƐǁŚĂƚŚĞŚĂĚďĞĞŶƐŚŽƵƚŝŶŐĂƚ
home before embarkation was, as Babington notes, ridiculous and a clear demonstration of the 
politicisation of the event after it had happened.60 
The emotive subject of the Black and Tans is an interesting sub-plot to the narrative of the 
mutiny as a whole. Although it gained significant traction in the 1970s, the mutineers themselves 
began to see the value of adding it into their accounts much sooner. As early as October 1927, Lance-
Corporal John Flannery wrote to the Minister of Defence, Desmond FitzGerald, on behalf of the ex-
ŽŶŶĂƵŐŚƚZĂŶŐĞƌƐǁŚŽ ? ŝŶŚŝƐǁŽƌĚƐ ?ŵƵƚŝŶŝĞĚ  ‘ĂƐĂƉƌŽƚĞƐƚĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ƚŚĞ ill-treatment of the Irish 
ƉĞŽƉůĞďǇƚŚĞůĂĐŬĂŶĚdĂŶƐ ? ?61 It was designed to raise the profile of the mutiny and its participants 
at a time when so many men and women were seeking recognition for their part in the struggle for 
Irish independence at home. The fact that it was a complete fabrication and that it had not been cited 
in the courts-martial proceedings appears to have been completely glossed over by all and sundry, 
whose collective memory of events (and their timings) loosely complemented the mutŝŶĞĞƌƐ ?
accounts. 
/Ŷ ůĂƚĞƌ ǇĞĂƌƐ ? ƚŚĞ ƐƚŽƌǇ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŵƵƚŝŶĞĞƌƐ ? ŵŽƚŝǀĂƚŝŽŶand Black and Tan reprisals were 
inseparably intertwined. It became a justification of their actions as much for themselves as for the 
authorities with whom they were in constant dialogue regarding compensation. Flannery continued 
to champion this idea in his witness statement to the Bureau of Military History in 1949, for example, 
placing it on the record for posterity.62 Frank (Francis) Moran, although not directly mentioning the 
BlacŬĂŶĚdĂŶƐ ?ŝŶƚŝŵĂƚĞĚŝŶ ? ? ? ?ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǀĂůƵĞŽĨƚŚĞŵƵƚŝŶǇǁĂƐĂƐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚŝŶĐŚĂůůĞŶŐŝŶŐ ‘:ŽŚŶ
Ƶůů ?ƐŵƉŝƌĞ ?ĂƐƚŚĞĂĐƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞ/ZǁĞƌĞŝŶ/ƌĞůĂŶĚĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐŽƵŐŚƚŶŽƚƚŽďĞĨŽƌŐŽƚƚĞŶ ?63 Again, 
this was an attempt to draw comparisons with the Irish case for those at home to relate to. Likewise, 
dŚŽŵĂƐdŝĞƌŶĞǇƌĞĐĂůůĞĚŽŶƚŚĞĂŝƌǁĂǀĞƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ĞǀĞƌǇƐŽůĚŝĞƌŽĨƚŚĞŽŶŶĂƵŐŚƚZĂŶŐĞƌƐƚŚĂƚƚŽŽŬƉĂƌƚ
in it, took part as a protest against the outrages committed by Crown Forces in this country. For what 
happĞŶĞĚŝŶŽƌŬƚŽĚĂǇĐŽƵůĚŚĂƉƉĞŶŝŶ'ĂůǁĂǇƚŽŵŽƌƌŽǁ ? ?64 Over time it cemented the view that 
the heroes and martyr of the Connaught Rangers mutiny were inspired by the same political motives 
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and feelings of indignation at British atrocities as those who had fought in Ireland. However, not only 
was this a deceitful misconception, but also suggested that all 200-300 men who initially took part, 
but were not subsequently tried by courts-martial, were similarly moved.   
The very idea that men had either joined as a result of displaying solidarity with their 
disaffected comrades or due to intimidation was firmly buried beneath the political myth. Yet this had 
proven to be the case in a number of instances. Charles Kerrigan, for example, later claimed that he 
was not motivated by news of Black and Tan atrocities, personally, as he had not received any such 
information from home. In the case of Solon, he also believed that the uprising was more a 
demonstration of solidarity with their pals at Jullundur than anything else.65 Another stated that it was 
a result of false reports that the mutineers at Jullundur had been massacred.66  Only through the 
strong personality of Daly did the course of events at the hill station develop as they did. This further 
questions the validity of a pre-meditated Sinn Féin operation as well as the motivating influence of 
the Black and Tans for Daly and his compatriots.  
Equally, despite some claims to the contrary  W namely from the mutineers themselves  W a 
number of men who took part in the events at Jullundur, but more particularly at Solon, were coerced 
into doing so. Private Frank Rye, an Englishman, was most careful about what he said to the mutineers, 
especially with regard to Ireland.67 A more serious case was the attempt to terrorise Corporal T. 
Murphy into joining the rebels. Despite being intimidated by Lance-Corporal Keenan who threatened 
ƚŽ ‘ďĞĂƚ ?ŚŝƐ ?&ƵĐŬŝŶŐũĂǁĂŶĚŐĞƚ ?Śŝŵ ?ŽƵƚďǇ&ƵĐŬŝŶŐĐŽŵƉƵůƐŝŽŶ ?ŝĨŚĞĚŝĚŶŽƚƐƵďŵŝƚ ?68 Corporal 
Kelly also pleaded in his defence that he acted under duress, whilst the hard-line approach adopted 
ďǇƚŚĞŵƵƚŝŶĞĞƌƐĂƚ^ŽůŽŶǁĂƐĞŶĐĂƉƐƵůĂƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŵĞŶƚŽĨĂ ‘ĐŽƵƌƚ ?ŝŶƚŚĞĐĂŶƚĞĞŶ ?ƉƌĞƐŝĚĞĚ
over by Daly that summarily tried Lance-Corporal Nolan to death in connection with a family affair.69 
This ŐŽĞƐ ƚŽ ƐŚŽǁ ŚŽǁ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ǁĂƐ ŶŽƚ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ ŚĞĂƌƚ ŽĨ ĞǀĞƌǇŽŶĞ ?Ɛ ŝŶĐĞŶƚŝǀĞ ƚŽ ĨĂůů ŝŶ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ
ringleaders as well as how the infectious furore of a mass uprising allowed events to spiral out of 
control and into the hands of a few strong-willed individuals. 
 
The issue of motivation, and the alleged political undercurrent, was once again brought into 
question following the return of the remaining mutineers to British shores. They were to serve varying 
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degrees of imprisonment across the country ranging from one year to life sentences of penal 
servitude. Joseph Hawes, whose death sentence had been commuted, was among those with the 
latter. Whilst in Maidstone prison, he penned an interesting, though often misspelt, letter to his 
mother that is worth quoting at length.  
When is the election comming of and what side will get in, Free State, or Republic. Who 
is opposing De Valera for our county Clare. I myself think the Free State Gov should be 
returned as we now have got the same freedom as Australia and Canada. we would take a 
Home Rule in 1914 this is more than I expected ever we would get. But Irishmen fought and 
spilt blood for this, so we need not thank any Country for what the green ile has got today. 
Other Countrys that Irishmen fought for, stood aloft, and looked camly on, while our dear 
ŽƵŶƚƌǇǁĂƐŐŽŝŶŐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞĨƵƌŶĞƐƐ ?ĚŽŶ ?ƚƚŚŝŶŬDŽƚŚĞƌĨŽƌŽŶĞŵŽŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚ/ǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚ
wish Ireland to get a Republic. I would walk smiling to the scaffold tomorrow. If I thought we 
had a chance of a Republic. But I think we have no chance at present. So I hope peace will be 
soon restored as it looks very bad over here for the Irish to be fighting among themselves. If 
we get anything its by uniting together we shall get it.70 
It reveals an appreciation of the state of affairs in Ireland as well as an interest in its political future, 
which was firmly behind the success of the pro-treatyites. Despite his support for the moderate wing 
of Sinn Féin appearing well thought out and even long-established, it does not corroborate some of 
his other comments made in later years that suggested he was very much considering his own loyalties 
after being forcefully removed from the aforementioned hurling match in 1919. Similarly, it does not 
follow the more radical political outlook expressed by the mutineers as the basis for their motivations 
in the decades after their release. If anything, it was an early glimpse of the mercenary approach taken 
by the mutineers in securing the support of those who could best serve their interests. In this 
particular case, the fact that a solicitor sent by Michael Collins had been to visit the mutineers in an 
attempt to get them released was reason enough to support his party. 
Similarly, twenty-eight petitions were written by ex-Connaught Rangers whilst in prison in 
1922 revealing comparable views. In a bid to have their sentences reduced, the almost identical 
appeals state that news of the deaths of Michael Collins and Arthur Griffith now lay behind their dutiful 
feelings to support the Provisional Government of Ireland against the rebels.71 Indeed, all but one 
expressed a desire to fight in the Free State Army, with six of them demonstrating a willingness to 
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return to prison to complete the remainder of their sentences afterwards were it deemed necessary.72 
DŝĐŚĂĞů<ĞĂƌŶĞǇǁĂƐŽŶĞƐƵĐŚ ƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶĞƌ ?ǁŚŽ ĐůĂŝŵĞĚ ƚŚĂƚŽƚŚĞƌŵƵƚŝŶĞĞƌƐǁŝƚŚ  ‘ŵŽƌĞ ŐƌŝĞǀŽƵƐ
ŽĨĨĞŶĐĞƐ ?ƚŚĂŶŚŝŵŚĂĚĂůƌĞĂĚǇďĞĞŶƌĞůĞĂƐĞĚĂŶĚǁĞƌĞ ?ďƵƚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨŽne or two, already 
fighting on behalf of the Free State. In his opinion, this ought to allow him to do the same; even were 
it just on parole.73  
Even more revealing were the noticeable references in at least five petitions to their wartime 
service, which alluded to a certain degree of pride in having served in the British Army. There was a 
tangible appreciation of some of the noble traditions of the army and the regiment as an institution, 
as well as an understanding of the significance of the struggle in which they were involved. This was 
also the case in a song composed by a Connaught Ranger about the mutiny, presumably whilst in 
prison pending court-mĂƌƚŝĂů ?/Ŷŝƚ ?ĚƵĞĚĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞŝƐƉĂŝĚƚŽĐĞƌƚĂŝŶŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐ ?ƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĨĂŵŽƵƐ
history and the sense of military discipline expected of them.74 Surprisingly, eight of the petitioners 
declared a renewed willingness to prove their loyalty to King and Empire that belie the firm political 
motivation that had allegedly spurred them into action in the first place.75 Silvestri terms this the 
blending of patriotism with loyalty to the Empire and a desire to serve the legitimate government in 
Ireland, in which there may be more than a modicum of truth.76 Yet, in pursuit of recognition and 
financial compensation from the Free State Government, such knowledge might have proven 
catastrophic. Unsurprisingly, therefore, it was quickly hushed-up following their release from prison 
in early 1923. If anything, it was a clear demonstration of the self-serving, mercenary attitude that 
ǁŽƵůĚĐŽŵĞƚŽĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĞƚŚĞŵƵƚŝŶĞĞƌƐ ?ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐŽǀĞƌƚŚĞĞŶƐƵŝŶŐĚĞĐĂĚĞƐ ? 
The history of the Connaught Rangers is littered with a number of conflicting narratives such 
as this, but it is worth highlighting that of one actor in particular who became instrumental in the post-
event writing of the mutiny; John Flannery. After initially attempting to dissuade the four instigators 
of the mutiny at Jullundur from downing arms, he joined their ranks and was never shy to exaggerate 
his role in the subsequent orchestration of events. However, he was neither as influential as some of 
his writings would later make out, nor as convinced in the righteousness of his cause. Indeed, 
according to several reports, Flannery authored a note on the penultimate day of the trial in which he 
informed the members of the court that he had only joined the mutiny in order to keep the officers 
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ŽĨƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŵĞŶƚĂďƌĞĂƐƚŽĨƚŚĞƌĞďĞůƐ ?ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂƐǁĞůůĂƐ ƚŽƉƌĞǀĞŶƚƚŚĞŵĨƌŽŵĚŽŝŶŐĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐĞǆƚƌĞŵĞ ?
His treachery enraged the other mutineers to such an extent that the authorities were forced to 
segregate Flannery from them for the remainder of the trial and upon their return to Britain.77 Yet, 
when tackling the issue in his witness statement for the Bureau of Military History (BMH) three 
decĂĚĞƐ ůĂƚĞƌ ?ŚĞǁĂƐƋƵŽƚĞĚĂƐ ƐĂǇŝŶŐ ?  ‘Ƶƚ ŝĨ ƚŚĞŽĨĨŝĐĞƌŽŶůǇŬŶĞǁǁŚĂƚǁĂƐĂƚ ƚŚĞďĂĐŬŽĨ ƚŚĞ
E ? ?K ?ƐŵŝŶĚ ?ŚĞǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶƐŽĚĞůŝŐŚƚĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŽĨĨĞƌ ? ?78 When faced with the possibility 
ŽĨĂĚĞĂƚŚƐĞŶƚĞŶĐĞ ?&ůĂŶŶĞƌǇ ?ƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƚŽƚŚƌŽǁŝŶŚŝƐůŽƚwith the officers and plead innocence was 
both callous and calculated, but not exactly unexpected. However, his true colours as a self-serving 
ego-centric were later revealed. Whilst in a position of relative comfort, his statement to the BMH 
claimed that he was playing the role of a double-double agent for the mutineers.79 No clearer 
demonstration is needed of how this episode has been moulded ex post by individual agendas. The 
note was real, and Flannery had indeed intended to save himself. It was an act that Joseph Hawes, as 
the second most vocal veteran, never forgave. 
A fierce dialogue between the Irish Free State and British Government broke out over the 
release of the Connaught Rangers mutineers in 1922. It was to be the first step along the road of a 
long and strenuous relationship between the ex-servicemen and their political representatives in 
which the former sought compensation for their defiant act, whilst the latter appeared to see them 
purely as a means to a political end. The President of the Executive Council, William Cosgrave, was 
firmly behind securing their release as part of a broader attempt to settle Irish affairs down in the 
counter-revolution, though his initial approaches were met with some opposition.80 The British were 
unwilling to co-operate, despite the decision to disband the Connaught Rangers in 1922, as they could 
not be seen to reward mutiny. The potential ramifications for the rest of the British army if it was 
 ‘ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚĨŽƌĂŵŽŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚƐŽůĚŝĞƌƐ ?ŐƵŝůƚǇŽĨƚŚĞŵŽƐƚƐĞƌŝŽƵƐŽĨŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĐƌŝŵĞƐ ?ĐŽƵůĚŐĞƚƌĞůĞĂƐĞ
ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŝƌƉƵŶŝƐŚŵĞŶƚďǇŵĞĂŶƐŽĨƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂŐŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?were unthinkable.81 Additionally, in most cases 
where sentences of this sort had been remitted and the prisoners discharged, it was usually done 
ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ ĂŶǇ  ‘ĨůŽƵƌŝƐŚ ŽĨ ƚƌƵŵƉĞƚƐ ? ? /ƚ ǁĂƐ ƚŚĞ ǀŝĞǁ of the Secretary of State for War that, once 
released, the general population tended to swallow up such men with the consequence that the rest 
of the army remained unaware of their fate, which was the desired intention given that it was the 
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sentence, and not the early discharge, that affected discipline.82 However, a case of this high a profile 
was unlikely to avoid such attention. 
In an interview held with Cosgrave and FitzGerald, the Secretary of State sought assurances 
that the release of the Connaught Rangers, if it were to proceed, would not be used to score political 
points over the British Government. The reƐƉŽŶƐĞǁĂƐ ŚĂƌĚůǇ ĐŽŶǀŝŶĐŝŶŐ ? ,Ğ ƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ǁŚŝůĞ
saying that they could not guarantee to prevent publicity, said that they would spare no effort to 
ƉƌĞǀĞŶƚŝƚ ? ?83 Notwithstanding, he recommended the mutineers to be released in order to secure the 
passing of the Indemnity (Amnesty) Bill in the Dáil, which would secure an agreement to exchange 
political prisoners on both sides. The inclusion of the Connaught Rangers was deemed essential to this 
following increased pressure from a number of Irish Deputies. The complication for both Cosgrave and 
the British Government was the concurrent movement to secure the release of the recalcitrant Joseph 
Dowling who had been court-martialled in July 1918 for his involvement in the Roger Casement affair. 
It was the strong view of the Prime Minister, Andrew Bonar Law, that Dowling ought to be released to 
avoid running the risk of losing the Amnesty Bill or having it held up for a period in circumstances that 
could give rise to further disturbances in Ireland, though only as a last resort. The Cabinet agreed to 
allow the Secretary of State for the Colonies to inform the Free State Government that they would be 
ƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĚ ƚŽ ĂĚǀŝƐĞ ƚŚĞ <ŝŶŐ ƚŽ ŐƌĂŶƚ ƚŚĞ ŽŶŶĂƵŐŚƚ ZĂŶŐĞƌƐ Ă ĨƌĞĞ ƉĂƌĚŽŶ ?  ‘ďƵƚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞǇ ǁĞƌĞ
prepared to make this ŐƌĞĂƚ ĐŽŶĐĞƐƐŝŽŶ ǁŝƚŚ ŐƌĞĂƚ ƌĞůƵĐƚĂŶĐĞ ? ĂŶĚŽŶůǇ ŝĨ ŝƚǁŽƵůĚ ŐƵĂƌĂŶƚĞĞ ƚŚĞ
immediate passing of the Bill through Parliament. The caveat was that it would not be extended to 
include the case of Dowling.84 
Cosgrave returned to the Dáil on 4 January 1923 to announce the inclusion of the Connaught 
ZĂŶŐĞƌƐŝŶƚŚĞĂŵŶĞƐƚǇ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŚĞĐŽŶǀĞǇĞĚĂƐ ‘ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌƉƌŽŽĨŽĨƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĚĞƐŝƌĞƚŽ
ĞĨĨĂĐĞ ďŝƚƚĞƌ ŵĞŵŽƌŝĞƐ ŽĨ ƌĞĐĞŶƚ ƚƌŽƵďůĞ ? ?85 The expected desire to seamlessly pass to a Second 
Reading of the Bill, however, was curtailed by those intractable Deputies (Members of Parliament) 
who had noticed the absence of an official mention of Dowling and a number of other political 
ƉƌŝƐŽŶĞƌƐƐƚŝůůŚĞůĚŝŶ^ĐŽƚůĂŶĚĂŶĚĞůĨĂƐƚ ?dŚĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌŽĨ,ŽŵĞĨĨĂŝƌƐ ?<ĞǀŝŶK ?,ŝŐŐŝŶƐ ?ĂƚƚĞŵƉƚĞĚ
to reassure members of the House that they had not been forgotten and that it was likely that they 
would be included in the general amnesty anyway as the British Government and military authorities 
ǁĞƌĞƵŶůŝŬĞůǇ ?  ‘ŚĂǀŝŶŐ ƐǁĂůůŽǁĞĚǁŚĂƚŵƵƐƚŚĂǀĞƐĞĞŵĞĚƚŽ ƚŚĞŵƚŚĞĐĂŵĞů  W the release of the 
Connaught Rangers  W wiůůƐƚƌĂŝŶĂƚǁŚĂƚŝƐĐŽŵƉĂƌĂƚŝǀĞůǇƚŚĞŐŶĂƚ ? ?86 The Bill was passed soon after 
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and the remaining mutineers were gradually released back into society. Dowling would remain in 
British custody until February 1924 by which time circumstances in Ireland dictated his immediate 
release from Liverpool prison. It marked a turning point in CumanŶŶĂŶ'ĂĞĚŚĞĂů ?s policy towards the 
Connaught Rangers, who after scoring a political victory in securing their release, turned their 
attention to more pressing matters. Among other things was the introduction of the Military Service 
Pensions Act (1924), used to placate mutinying officers of the National Army who felt that 
reorganisation and demobilisation following the end of the Civil War was diluting republican 
sentiment and favouring former British Army officers over former Irish Volunteers (IRA).87  
The mutineers returned home to a brief flurry of attention and adulation, being met by a 
Republican delegation at Victoria Station as well as an official Reception Committee at the ferry port 
in Dun Laoghaire in January 1923. The latter included four Dáil members and the Chairman of the Irish 
Self-Determination League, whose publication The Irish Exile for May 1922 had expressed concern 
over the continued imprisonment of the Connaught Rangers and of Joseph Dowling.88 The fanfare 
ƋƵŝĐŬůǇĞǀĂƉŽƌĂƚĞĚĂƐƚŚĞĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚŝŶŐƌĞĂůŝƚŝĞƐŽĨƚŚĞƐĞŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŚĞƌŽĞƐ ?ƐƚĂƚƵƐĂƐƌŝƚŝƐŚĂƌŵǇǀĞƚĞƌĂŶƐ
competed with the long-ƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƌĞƉƵďůŝĐĂŶƉƌĞũƵĚŝĐĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ/ƌŝƐŚŵĞŶǁŚŽĚŽŶŶĞĚƚŚĞ ‘ƌĞĚůŝǀĞƌǇŽĨ
shaŵĞ ? ?89 Many mutineers soon found themselves unable to obtain employment and largely fell into 
a state of poverty and destitution as their story fell from the public gaze. 
A veritable political storm arose as indignant Deputies continued to fight for the impoverished 
mutineers whose sea of letters in search of work and compensation swamped the Government. Alfred 
Byrne, the Deputy for North Dublin, was particularly keen to see that the ideals for which these men 
had endured hardships since 1920 were not forgotten and encouraged the Government to make 
gratuities, compensation, and employment available to them as a reward.90 A committee was set up 
to look into the pension claims of the Connaught Rangers, but after furnishing their report in 
November 1925, the Minister of Finance was not prepared to recommend them any such payment. 
However, those who had not already turned down the opportunity of Government employment 
would be afforded a chance to obtain such work.91 Few men took up this offer, relying more heavily 
on charity or their military experience. Indeed, twenty-three enrolled in the National Army and nine 
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in the Civic Guard, though this did little to enhance their pension claims at the time, despite continued 
support from some quarters.  
Miles Keogh wrote to John Flannery, who had become the leading figure of the Association of 
the ex-ŽŶŶĂƵŐŚƚZĂŶŐĞƌƐ ?ĚĞĐůĂƌŝŶŐŝŶ ? ? ? ?ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇ ‘ĚĞƐĞƌǀĞƚŚĞǁ ŽůĞ-hearted sympathy of their 
ĂĚŵŝƌĞƌƐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĂƐĂƚŝƐĨĂĐƚŽƌǇƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨǇŽƵƌĂĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?92 ^ŝŵŝůĂƌůǇ ?^ĞĂŶK ?>ĂŝĚŚin and John Lyons 
ŚĂƌĂŶŐƵĞĚ ƚŚĞ 'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ƚŽ ŝŶĐůƵĚĞ ƚŚĞ ƚŝŵĞ ƐƉĞŶƚ ŝŶ ƉƌŝƐŽŶ ĂƐ  ‘ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ ? ƚŽ ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞ
towards their pension claims. The draft reply suggested that the Government was not prepared to 
introduce legislation of that nature, whilst ĂƐĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƐƵƉƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƌǇƌĞŵĂƌŬƐŶŽƚĞĚ P ‘ƉĂƌƚĨƌŽŵƚŚŝƐ
ĂŶĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƚŽĂŵĞŶĚƚŚĞĐƚǁŽƵůĚďƌŝŶŐĂŚŽƌŶĞƚ ?ƐŶĞƐƚĂďŽƵƚǇŽƵƌĞĂƌƐ ?DĂŶǇsŽůƵŶƚĞĞƌƐǁŚŽǁĞƌĞ
imprisoned and who served the Army have not been granted pensions. The Act permits recognition 
of iŵƉƌŝƐŽŶŵĞŶƚǁŚĞŶŝƚŝƐŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞůǇƉƌĞĐĞĚĞĚďǇƉĞŶƐŝŽŶĂďůĞĂĐƚŝǀĞŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ ?ƚŽǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞ
Connaught Rangers could not claim.93 Lyons was told the same thing in the Dáil in September, which 
ƉƌŽŵƉƚĞĚ Śŝŵ ƚŽ ĞǆĐůĂŝŵ ?  ‘dŚĞŶ ƚŚŽƐĞ ǁŚŽ ĨŽƵŐŚƚ ĨŽƌ /ƌĞůĂŶĚ ĨŽƵŐŚƚ ŝŶ ǀĂŝŶ ? ?94 The same debate 
continued into 1927 and Ernest Blythe was forced to defend the policy to refuse the mutineers 
compensation on account of the subsequent difficulties that would ensue with regard to claims from 
ordinary Irish civilians who gave assistance to the national struggle at heavy material loss and at great 
risk to themselves.95 Just because they had worn a uniform did not distinguish the ex-Ramgers from 
those who had not, whilst sceptics continued to question the impact of the mutiny on British rule in 
Ireland when compared to the effect of Royal Irish Constabulary resignations.96 It was the clearest sign 
to date that the Government was prepared to wash its hands of a difficult situation that had the 
potential to deteriorate into unmanageable levels of time and monetary loss. 
Realising that their chance for a successful negotiation of their position with Cumann na 
nGhaedheal was somewhat limited, the mutineers once again changed tack and began to promote 
themselves as supporters of the opposition party. This rather reflected the move towards De Valera 
made by old IRA members, who equally felt that the current administration had conveniently 
forgotten them during the land division of 1923-1932.97 The moderate stance for Irish freedom in India 
now appeared slightly more radicalised as they attempted to draw some personal gain from promises 
                                                          
92 MSPC, DOD/2/16327, Keogh to Flannery, 9 December 1926. 
93 Ibid, Question No. 25, which appears on the Order WĂƉĞƌĨŽƌƚŽĚĂǇ ?ƐŵĞĞƚŝŶŐŶDáil, 8 December 1926. 
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made by Fianna Fáil prior to the 1932 General Election.98 Progress was slow, due largely to the volume 
of claims applications that were received when it was announced that the Connaught Rangers were 
to receive their due recognition. These had to be carefully vetted and cross-referenced as the single 
gratuities of up to £150 for claimants who had enlisted on a short-service engagement after 18 April 
1918, and pensions of ten shillings per week supposedly earmarked for those with long-service 
ĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƐƉƌĞĚĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞǁĂƌ ?ǁĞƌĞůŝŬĞůǇƚŽŚĂǀĞĂƐŝŐŶŝĨĐĂŶƚŝŵƉĂĐƚŽŶƚŚĞ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĨŝŶĂŶĐĞƐ
given its significant investment in welfare amidst the effects of the great depression and the on-going 
Trade Wars with Britain.99 Not only that, as Marie Coleman has stated, it also reflected the desire to 
ƉůĂĐĂƚĞĂŶǇ ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĚŝƐƋƵŝĞƚĂďŽƵƚƌĞǁĂƌĚŝŶŐŵĞŶǁŚŽŚĂĚĞŶůŝƐƚĞĚǀŽůƵŶƚĂƌŝůǇŝŶƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚƌŵǇ
after a ĐƌƵĐŝĂůŵŽŵĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ? ?100 
ǀĞŶ ĂůǇ ?Ɛ ĨĂŵŝůǇ ĨĂĐĞĚ ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ ĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚŝĞƐ ƐĞĐƵƌŝŶŐĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů ĐŽŵƉĞŶƐĂƚŝŽŶ ĚƵĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ
wording of the legislation only permitting widows and children of the deceased to apply. A letter to 
the Secretary of the Claims Committee from his sister, Theresa Maher, outlined the deplorable 
financial situation of the family, which, despite the hardship, had remained loyal supporters to Fianna 
Fáil at both Dáil and Local Government elections.101 Eventually, the Minister for Defence, Frank Aiken, 
ǁĂƐ ĂďůĞ ƚŽ ƐĞĐƵƌĞ Ă ĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ĂůůŽǁĂŶĐĞ ĨŽƌĂůǇ ?Ɛ ĨĂƚŚĞƌ ŝŶ ĂĐĐŽƌĚĂŶĐĞǁŝƚŚ ^ĞĐƚŝŽŶ  ? ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
recently passed Connaught Rangers (Pensions) Act (1936), amounting to ten shillings a week. This was 
in line with the compensation awarded to seven others who had forfeited their earnings-based British 
pensions due to them upon completion of twelve years of service.102 It was a political coup for De 
Valera and was greatly received by the mutineers after many years of toil. Fianna Fáil took over 
custody of the Connaught Rangers from Cumann na nGaedheal at this juncture after the latter had 
ĂůůŽǁĞĚƚŚĞŝƌŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƚŽĐŽŽůĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĞĂŵŶĞƐƚǇŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?/ŶƚŚĞŵƵƚŝŶĞĞƌƐ ?ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚƉƵƌƐƵŝƚŽĨ
their self-interest, it is not surprising that their political loyalties began to lie increasingly with the 
former. In the ensuing decades, the account of the mutiny would echo this stance by assuming a more 
radical political tone. 
Years later, the Connaught Rangers mutiny continued to influence diplomacy and politics on 
account of its re-appropriation. The conflicted relationship of commemorating an Irish martyr who 
had willingly served in British uniform proved difficult for both sides to reconcile. When the United 
^ƚĂƚĞƐ ?ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĂƚƚĂĐŚĠůĂŝĚĂǁƌĞĂƚŚĂƚthe James Joseph Daly memorial in Glasnevin Cemetery during 
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the annual Connaught Rangers Mutiny Commemoration in 1959, the British ambassador to Dublin felt 
ŵŽǀĞĚƚŽƌĞŵĂƌŬ ‘ƚŚĞĞǆƚƌĞŵĞŝŵƉƌŽƉƌŝĞƚǇŽĨŚŽŶŽƵƌŝŶŐŵƵƚŝŶǇŝŶƚŚĞĂƌŵĞĚĨŽƌĐĞƐŽĨĂĐŽƵŶƚƌǇƚŚĂƚ
ŚĂ ?Ě ?ďĞĞŶĂŶĂůůǇŝŶƚǁŽǁĂƌƐ ?. This was particularly the case given its timing (3 November) and its 
proximity to Remembrance Sunday.103 Even in 1970, on the fiftieth anniversary of the mutiny, the 
ƌĞƉĂƚƌŝĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂůǇ ?ƐƌĞŵĂŝŶƐƚŽ/ƌĞůĂŶĚĨŽƌƌĞďƵƌŝĂůǁĂƐŵŽƌĞŽĨĂƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĞǀĞŶƚƌĞůĂƚŝŶŐƚŽĐƵƌƌĞŶƚ
affairs than anything else. The role of the State remained somewhat of a complicated issue, despite 
having arranged and contributed to the cost of it all, with the decision regarding military participation 
not being cancelled by the Taoiseach until the very last moment. In fact, the Department of External 
ĨĨĂŝƌƐ ?ǀŝĞǁǁĂƐƚŽ ‘ƉůĂǇƚŚĞǁŚŽůĞĂĨĨĂŝƌďǇĞĂƌ ? ?104 He was reburied in Tyrellspass, with Joseph Hawes, 
then aged seventy-seven, in attendance, whilst the remains of the two others shot during the raid on 
the magazine at Solon were reinterred at Glasnevin Cemetery where the Connaught Rangers 
Cenotaph had been unveiled in 1949. Commemorations in Tyrellspass began on 30 August, predating 
the return of his body by two months, with the unveiling of a memorial to the men of Westmeath and 
Offaly who had died on Irish soil and foreign wars of independence. It is estimated that 2,000 people 
ĂƚƚĞŶĚĞĚ ƚŚŝƐ ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ ? ƚŚŽƵŐŚ ƚŚŝƐǁĂƐĞĐůŝƉƐĞĚďǇ ƚŚĞ  ? ? ? ? ?ǁŚŽ ƚƵƌŶĞĚŽƵƚ ƚŽǁŝƚŶĞƐƐĂůǇ ?Ɛ ƌĞ-
internment, which bore all the ceremonial hallmarks reserved for a republican martyr.105 It was a 
moment, which demonstrated that both his personal sacrifice, as well as the political narrative 
subsequently attributed to the actions of the Connaught Rangers mutiny as a whole, would endure.  
 
In conclusion, it must be said that the Connaught Rangers mutiny was primarily a disciplinary 
issue stemming from poor officer-man relations and only latterly of a political nature. The combination 
of the Indian heat, boredom, detached officers and, of course, news of the situation in Ireland, created 
a combustible situation that was only ignited by a few strong individuals and allowed to develop 
through incompetent leadership. The political angle was subsequently adopted by both sides who 
found a ready-made excuse for the escalation of events. The British authorities, unwilling to allow 
attention to fall on the post-war institutional failings of the army, were keen to suggest that Sinn Féin 
infiltration was to blame but that it had been quickly dealt with and had not affected any other units. 
The mutineers themselves, although rather more moderate in their testimonies during the courts-
martial proceedings, would later find value in elaborating their story to include this political element. 
The addition of the Black and Tan atrocities proved especially emotive. This was further propagated 
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by ^ ĂŵWŽůůŽĐŬŝŶŚŝƐƌĂĚŝŽƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞ ‘/Ŷ^ ĞĂƌĐŚŽĨĂDƵƚŝŶǇ ?ĂŶĚŚŝƐƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚƉƵďůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƚŚŽƵŐŚ
ĞǀĞŶŚĞǁĂƐĨŽƌĐĞĚƚŽĂĚŵŝƚƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞĐĂƵƐĞŽĨǁŚĂƚŚĂƉƉĞŶĞĚĂƚ:ƵůůƵŶĚƵƌŵĂǇŶŽƚŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶĞŶƚŝƌĞůǇ
political, but one suspects that politics played a part ŝŶƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐŝƚǇŐŝǀĞŶƚŽŝƚ ? ?106 This, coupled with 
ŵƵƚŝŶĞĞƌƐ ?ŝŶƐŝƐƚĞŶĐĞƚŽƉƵƌƐƵĞƚŚĞůŝŶĞŽĨůĞĂƐƚƌĞƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞǁŝƚŚƌĞŐĂƌĚƚŽŝŵƉƌŽǀŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƌƉĞƌƐŽŶĂů
situations, whether it be re-declaring their allegiance to King and Country, self-promoting to Cumann 
na nGaedheal, or claiming to be ardent supporters of Fianna Fáil, must certainly mean their actions 
were not motivated by a political ideal. 
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